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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary 
The issues in this case primarily concern a settlement agreement (hereinafter "Memorandum 
of Understanding" or "MOU"); the rights and obligations of the parties thereunder; and the findings 
of the district court under various summary judgment rulings and as a result of trial during the course 
of a six-year proceeding. 
In 1995, the parties agreed to participate in a joint venture. In connection with their joint 
venture activities, the joint venture partners formed two corporations, one of which took out 
substantial loans from the Bank of Eastern Idaho (now Bank of Idaho) and the Eastern Idaho 
Economic Development Council ("EIEDC"). When difficulties arose with the joint venture 
business, the parties agreed to end their association. The terms of that separation were set forth in 
the MOU, under which Appellants purchased the Respondents' interest in the joint venture business. 
After executing the MOU, Appellants interfered with and manipulated the business operations of the 
joint venture business in order to prevent Respondents from receiving purchase consideration under 
the MOU. This litigation included multiple summary judgment rulings, and a three-day trial. 
Appellants raise thirteen issues on appeal, many of which were never presented to the district court 
during the six-year course of this litigation, and for which there is no ruling in the record. 
B. Factual Background 
The Parties - Appellant Jan Vreeken ("Vreeken") is a citizen of The Netherlands. Appellant 
Gerbroeders Meijer Belegging, B.V. ("Gerbroeders") is a foreign co,yoration organized in The 
Netherlands. Gerbroeders is apparently owned by Vreeken and is the parent corporation of 
Appellants' Lockwood Engineering B.V. ("LEBV"), a foreign corporation organized in The 
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Netherlands; Lockwood Packaging Corporation ("LPC"), a Delaware corporation; and Lockwood 
Packaging Corporation Idaho ("LPCI"), an Idaho corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
LPC. (R. Vol. III, p. 427; Vol. I, p. 53-54). LEBV, LPC and LPCI are sometimes referred to as the 
"Lockwood Entities." Vreeken, at all times relevant hereto, was the chief executive officer, director 
and sole beneficial owner of Gerbroeders and the Lockwood Entities. (R. Vol. III, p. 427). 
Christianne Vreeken ("Christianne") is the daughter of Vreeken and the successor in interest 
of the Bank of Idaho, the original plaintiff in this case. (R. Vol. I, p. 118; Vol. VI, p. 1289-90). 
Neither Christianne nor the Bank of Idaho is a party to this appeal. 
Respondent Thomas R. Gold ("T. Gold") is a Massachusetts resident and former officer of 
LPCI. Respondent Richard L. Gold ("R. Gold") is a Massachusetts resident. Respondent Tomac 
Packaging, Inc. ("Tomac") is a Massachusetts corporation. (R. Vol. 1, p. 53). All three Respondents 
are hereinafter referred to as "the Golds." 
The Joint Venture- Vreeken, through LEBV, and the Golds commenced a joint venture in 
1995, initially selling produce packaging machinery and equipment in the United States, Canada and 
Mexico. The parties entered into a Joint Venture Agreement to memorialize their business venture 
(R. Vol. V, p. 883-92). In furtherance of the joint venture business contemplated by the parties, LPC 
was formed and ( contrary to Appellants' erroneous assertion in their brief) was initially owned 50% 
by LEBV and 50% by Tomac. The business operations ofTomac were eventually taken over by 
LPC and in connection therewith the 50% ownership interest held by Tomac in LPC was transferred 
to T. Gold. (R. Vol. V. p. 875 and 894-97). 
The equipment was to be sold by LEBV (the manufacturer) to LPC as a jointly owned and/or 
controlled master distributor in the United States for further distribution to distributors and end users. 
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(R. Vol. I, p. 54-55; R. Vol. V, p. 874-75). LPCI, based in Idaho Falls, was formed in 1997 in order 
to manufacture bags and sell other packaging materials, and to act as the distributor of the LEBV 
equipment in the Northwest United States. (R. Vol. V, p. 875; Vol. VI, p. 1290). 
Loans/Personal Guarantees - In! 997, LPCI entered into loan transactions with the Bank of 
Idaho in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Prior to the split of the parties and their entry into the MOU, Vreeken, 
T. Gold and the other Lockwood Entities, through a succession of guarantee agreements, became 
jointly and severally liable for LPCI's obligations to Bank ofidaho. (R. Vol. I, p. 21-40). At the time 
the instant lawsuit commenced, LPCI had defaulted under its agreements with Bank of Idaho. 
Principal and interest owing under the Bank ofidaho loan totaled $619,937.11. (R. Vol. I, p. 24). 
During the course of business operations, LPCI also obtained a loan from EIEDC. The 
obligation to repay such loan was jointly and severally guaranteed by T. Gold, Vreeken, LPC, LPCI 
and LEBV. EIEDC obtained a total judgment in the amountof$253,331.95 on its loan against LPC, 
LPCI, LEBV, T. Gold and Vreeken. (Trial. Ex. 7, p. 2). R. Gold purchased the interest ofEIEDC 
under the loan, including all rights to collect under relevant guarantees on February 19, 2004. (R. 
Vol. V, p. 873 and 949-55; Trial Ex. 14). 
Prior to the formation of the parties' joint venture, Tomac had entered into a loan transaction 
with Citizens Bank ofMassachusetts. R. Gold personally guaranteed Tomac' s obligations under this 
loan and pledged certain marketable securities as collateral. (R. Vol. V, p. 959). 
Problems with the Business - From and after February 28, 1997, both LPC and LPCI 
experienced numerous financial accounting problems, including, but not limited to, problems 
reconciling balance sheets and income statements, problems tracking inventory receipts and sales, 
and problems verifying accuracy of accounts receivable. (R. Vol. IV, p. 843-72; R. Vol. V, p. 875). 
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In March 1998, Vreeken and Jan Postema visited the LPC offices in Woburn, Massachusetts. 
Jan Postema at the time was the Treasurer of LPC and also the Chief Financial Officer of LEBV. 
During such visit, Vreeken and Jan Postema were given access to all of the business records ofLPC 
and LPCI located in the Woburn offices. (R. Vol. V, p. 875-76). 
In August 1999, Jerry Ceuppens and Jack Schipper visited the Woburn office and were given 
access to all of the financial records located in the Woburn office ofLPC and LPCI. At such time, 
Jack Schipper was the Assistant Controller ofLEBV and Jerry Ceuppens was a Vice President of 
LEBV, and in charge of all North American activities for LEBV. At the time of such visit, John Teti 
was the Controller for LPC and LPCI. John Teti provided to T. Gold a Memo dated February 7, 
2000, wherein Mr. Teti advised T. Gold in detail of the records reviewed by Jerry Ceuppens and Jack 
Schipper. (R. Vol. V, p. 876, 898). On August 10, 1999, Jerry Ceuppens and Jack Schipper 
provided to T. Gold and Vreeken a "Management Letter," which set forth the findings and 
conclusions arrived at by Jerry Ceuppens and Jack Schipper after their visit to the Woburn office 
pertaining to the accounting, sales, administration, administrative organization and management of 
LPC. (R. Vol. V, p. 876, 899-904). 
In the fall of 1999, T. Gold and Vreeken began to negotiate the sale ofT. Gold's interest in 
LPC and LPCI to Vreeken. On November 12, 1999, Vreeken provided to T. Gold a letter wherein 
Vreeken demonstrated that he was fully aware of the financial accounting problems experienced by 
LPC and LPCI. (R. Vol. V, p. 876-77, 905-08). On December 11, 1999, T. Gold provided to 
Vreeken a "buy out proposal." In paragraph 6 of the proposal, T. Gold stated the following: 
The deal is AS IS WHERE IS. I am not going to make any financial or other 
representations about the business, or allow any other basis for anyone to come back 
against me when it comes time to pay the purchase price. In other words, this must 
be a clean deal if your desire is to pay me out over time. (R. Vol. V, p. 877, 909-11 ). 
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Vreeken testified that the Golds did not provide any promises, representations, warranties or 
covenants except those set forth in the MOU and Appellants were not relying on any representations, 
warranties and/or statements in connection with executing the MOU. (R. Vol. IV, p. 826-34). 
Memorandum of Understanding By the end of 1999, the relationships between the joint 
venture parties had broken down and on May 12, 2000, the parties entered into the MOU. The MOU 
was executed by the Golds and Vreeken, in which control of LPC and LPCI was transferred to 
Vreeken. 1 
In consideration of the Golds' transfer of their interests in LPC and LPCI to Vreeken and the 
Lockwood Entities, Vreeken, LPC and LPCI agreed to do the following: 
1. LPC and LPCI were to use best efforts to obtain the release of the Golds from their 
various personal guarantees of the Bank ofidaho, EIEDC and Citizens Bank loans. If necessary to 
effect such releases, Vreeken agreed to personally guarantee the applicable loans. (Trial Ex. 6). 
2. Pursuant to paragraph 2a. of the MOU, LPC and LPCI agreed to pay to R. Gold 
$100,000.00 and to T. Gold $450,000.00 under various so-called "Payout Notes." The MOU 
specifically set forth the payment terms for the Payout Notes. The amount due on the Payout Notes 
was to be accelerated and become fully due and payable after non-payment of the amounts when due 
and receipt of a ten day default letter. (Trial Ex. 6, p. 3-4). The Payout Notes were not paid at the 
scheduled time and default letters were sent on November 16, 2000, December 21, 2000 and 
February 12, 2001. (R. Vol. 5., p. 877). 
1 The MOU was to be a preliminary document to be integrated into so-called definitive 
documents. However, in the absence of definitive documents, the MOU specifically provides that it is 
the binding and final agreement of the parties relating to the breakup of the joint venture. No definitive 
documents were ever signed, and all parties acknowledged that the MOU constitutes the final expression 
of their understanding. (R. Vol. I, p. 55; R. Vol. ID, p. 428-29). 
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The MOU further provided in paragraph 2a. that the Payout Notes were to be secured by the 
assets of LPC and LPCI, with such security interest being subordinate to all current bank loans, all 
security positions on record at the time of the MOU, and any future refinancing of such bank loans. 
(Trial Ex. 6, p. 3-4). The security interest granted to T. Gold and R. Gold pursuant to such provision 
of the MOU was perfected pursuant to the filing of the financing statements. (Trial Ex. 8 and 9). 
The MOU also provided that there were to be full mutual releases of the respective parties, except 
for matters arising out of performance of the MOU, and for fraud. (Trial Ex. 6, p. 3 and 5). In 
addition, the MOU provided that there were no representations or warranties, except as specifically 
provided in the MOU. No financial representations or warranties regarding LPC or LPCI were made 
by Respondents in the MOU. (Trial Ex. 6, p. 8). 
UCC Filings -In violation of the MOU, LEBV and Gerbroeders filed financing statements 
in Idaho and other jurisdictions purporting to evidence a security interest in the assets of LPC and 
LPCI which were superior in priority to those ofT. Gold and R. Gold. (Trial Ex. 13A and 13B). No 
documents exist granting any security interest to LEBV and/or Gerbroeders in the assets of LPCI. 
No documents exist granting any security interest to Gerbroeders in the assets ofLPC (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 9-12).2 Tluough these improper filings, Vreeken intentionally attempted to interfere with the 
ability of the Golds to access their collateral under the MOU, and to enforce their claims against the 
Lockwood Entities to make payments on the Payout Notes. All of the improper UCC-1 Financial 
Statements were signed by Vreeken. (Trial Ex. 13A and 13B; Tr. Vol. III, p. 52-55). 
2 Respondents refer to the trial transcript which is in three volumes as follows: Volume I - April 
2-3, 2007 (April 3, 2007, testimony begins on p. 122); Volume II - April 4, 2007 (morning session); and 
Volume III-April 4, 2007 (afternoon session). 
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Bank ofidaho Assignment to Christianne - Sometime prior to October 12, 2001, the Bank 
ofidaho agreed to accept $617,870.59 as full satisfaction of the LPCI indebtedness. On October 12, 
2001, LPCI agent and representative William Wendels paid $200,000 to the Bank ofidaho with a 
Bank of Commerce check (No. 160346), and on October 15, 2001, the balance of the funds due to 
Bank of Idaho were paid, in the amount of $417,870.59. That same day, Christianne and the Bank 
ofidaho executed an Assignment. (R. Vol. III, p. 504-19). The Assignment states that the Bank of 
Idaho assigned to Christianne its rights under the LPCI loan dated November 18, 1999, including 
the right to enforce the loan against the guarantors; and that the Bank of Idaho also assigned its 
security interests in the LPCI assets. (R. Vol. III, p. 504-05). Vreeken provided the funds 
Christianne used to acquire the Assignment from the Bank ofldaho. (R. Vol. III, p. 498-99). 
Transfer to Telford - Vreeken, despite the provisions of the MOU, transferred, or caused 
LPCI to transfer, or acquiesced in the transfer of substantially all ofits assets to Telford Corporation, 
("Telford"), a corporation controlled and operated by Christianne, thereby hampering the ability of 
LPCI to make payment on the Payout Notes, and completely impairing the collateral of the Golds 
under the MOU. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 21-26; Tr. Vol. I, p. 34-40, 99-120). 
Status ofLPCI During the Course of Litigation-During the course of this litigation, LPCI 
went from an active corporation with millions of dollars in sales and assets to, at the time of trial, 
a defunct corporation with virtually no assets of value. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 27-35). 
C. Procedural History 
The action commenced on April 27, 2001, when the Bank of Idaho filed its verified 
Complaint against LEBV, Gerbroeders, Vreeken and T. Gold, the guarantors of the LPCI-Bank of 
Idaho Loan, to enforce and satisfy the Bank ofldaho loan. (R. Vol. I, p. 21-40). On June 26, 2001, 
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T. Gold filed a verified Answer, Cross-claim and Third-Party Complaint. R. Gold and Tomac also 
joined as Third-Party Plaintiffs. LPC and LPCI were named as Third-Party Defendants. (R. Vol. 
. I, p. 41-79). On November 2, 2001, LPC and LPCI filed an Answer to the Bank of Idaho's 
Complaint and LPC cross-claimed against the Golds. (R. Vol. I, p. 101-08). 
As a result of the assigmnent, Cluistianne was substituted as Plaintiff for the Bank ofldaho. 
T. Gold and R. Gold filed an Amended Cross-claim and Third-Party Complaint for Claim and 
Delivery on October 11, 2002. (R. Vol. I, p. 188-228; R. Vol. III, p. 504). LEBV, Gerbroeders, LPC, 
LPCI and Vreeken filed their Answer and Counterclaim to Third-Party Complaint and Cross-Claim 
on July 9, 2003. (R. Vol. III, p. 426-34). 
On December 1, 2004, the district court issued an Opinion, Decision, and Order dismissing 
with prejudice Cluistianne' s Complaint ( as successor to Bank ofidaho) against all named defendants 
as a sanction for repeatedly failing to appear at her deposition. (R. Vol. IV, p. 761-69). Any and all 
obligations that were the subject ofCluistianne's Complaint were deemed fully satisfied and paid 
in full. (R. Vol. IV, p. 769). This judgment is now final and unappealable because of Cluistianne's 
failure to timely submit an appeal to this Court. 
The Golds filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 14, 2005, seeking dismissal 
with prejudice of all claims brought against them, a declaratory judgment regarding the performance 
of, and amount due under, the MOU, entry of a money judgment against Lockwood, LPC, and LPCI, 
and a writ of possession allowing the Golds to obtain possession of the assets ofLPC and LPCI in 
order to foreclose the security interest held by the Golds in those assets. (R. Vol. IV, p. 812-19). 
The district court issued its Opinion, Decision and Order on T. Gold, R. Gold and Tomac's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on May 3, 2005. (R. Vol. V, p. 1082-1106). 
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In its Opinion, the district court dismissed Vreeken and the Lockwood Entities' claims for 
misrepresentation and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The remainder 
of claims brought by Vreeken and the Lockwood Entities were dismissed pursuant to section 2.h. 
of the MOU. Concerning the Golds' claims, the court found l) that the Lockwood Entities were (a) 
in default under section 2.a. of the MOU, (b) liable on the Payout Note to R. Gold in the principal 
amount of$100,000.00 plus interest, and (c) liable on the Payout Note to T. Gold in the principal 
amount of$450,000.00 plus interest. The court further found that such obligations were secured by 
the assets of the Lockwood Entities. The court further found that LPC and LPCI were required to 
make annual payments to T. Gold in the amount equal to 25% of their respective net profits until the 
aggregate amount of such payments reaches $100,000.00. (R. Vol. V, p. 1104-05). 
On September 2, 2005, the district court issued its Opinion, Decision, and Order on the 
parties' Motions for Reconsideration. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1121-36). In its Opinion, the district court 
explained that, pursuant to MOU paragraph 2.c., any damages incurred by the Golds as a result of 
the failure of Vreeken, LEBV, LPC, and LPCI to obtain the releases of the loans specified therein 
are secured by the assets ofLPC and LPCI. (R. Vol. VI., p. 434). The district court also ordered 
Vreeken to effectuate a personal guarantee on the Citizens Bank Loan referred to in the MOU. (R. 
Vol. V., p. 1134). 
On August 21, 2006, the Golds filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming that 
Vreeken was personally liable on the Payout Notes. (R. Vol. V, p. 1164-68). The Golds additionally 
filed a separate Motion for Entry of Summary Judgment, asking the district court to enter summary 
judgment pursuant to the court's prior opinions on the Golds' first Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Motions for Reconsideration. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1169-76). The court entered Summary Judgment 
9 
pursuant to its prior opinion on October 20, 2006. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1194-98). On November 8, 2006, 
the district court granted in part and denied in part the Golds' second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, finding among other things 1) that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether 
or not Vreeken intentionally interfered with the obligations of LPC and LPCI under the MOU by 
filing UCC liens, 2) that the Golds had failed to show sufficient evidence to find Vreeken personally 
liable on the Payout Notes, 3) that Vreeken was obligated to indemnify the Golds on the Citizens 
Bank and EIEDC loans. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1199-1235). 
The issues not resolved by the prior summary judgments were tried before the Honorable Jon 
J. Shindurling from April 2, 2007 to April 4, 2007. The district court issued its Opinion, Decision, 
and Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 25, 2007. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1288-
1311 ). The district court found Vreeken personally liable as a result of his wrongful conduct. The 
district court also entered additional findings of fact and law related to the foregoing and in support 
of its summary judgment findings. Judgment was filed October 5, 2007. (R. Vol VII, p. 1462-68). 
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on October 31, 2007. (R. Vol. VII, p. 1470). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Golds disagree with Appellants' characterization of the issues on appeal as follows: 
(a) Whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Appellants' cross-claims 
when Appellants did not establish evidence of essential elements of their claims and the 
claims were barred by the MOU? 
(b) Whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Appellants' breach of the 
MOU when it relied on uncontroverted evidence? 
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(c) Whether the district court correctly detem1ined that Vreeken is obligated to indemnify the 
Golds on the Citizens Bank and EIEDC loans based on the language and intent of the MOU? 
( d) Whether the district court erred in failing to find Respondents breached fiduciary duties when 
Appellants did not plead such claim, Appellants never obtained a ruling from the court to 
conform the pleadings to any purported evidence on such claim, Respondents objected to 
evidence allegedly related to such claim, and the MOU barred the claim? 
( e) Whether the district court erred in failing to have Vreeken subpoenaed in his native language 
when Appellants never raised the issue before the district court, never asserted the 
affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process, and waived any alleged defense 
based on personal jurisdiction? 
(f) Whether the district court erred in failing to provide Vreeken a Dutch interpreter during his 
deposition when he was represented by competent counsel who never requested an 
interpreter, failed to object when his deposition was used in the summary judgment motions, 
and demonstrated his ability to communicate well in English? 
(g) Whether the district court correctly determined that Vreeken engaged in wrongful conduct 
based on tile substantial, competent evidence of wrongful acts? 
(h) Whether the district court erred in regard to its findings pertaining to the assignment from 
Bank ofidaho to Christianne? 
(i) Whether the district court properly admitted evidence of statements made by Christianne 
when the evidence showed she was Vreeken's agent, was unavailable for trial and made 
statements against her interests, and when the court's findings were supported by other 
substantial, competent evidence? 
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G) Whether the district court correctly refused to admit certain documentary evidence and to 
allow the testimony of Jack Schipper when Appellants failed to disclose the documentary 
evidence and Appellants never requested Mr. Schipper as a witness? 
(k) Whether the district court properly determined that certain assets were owned by LPCI as 
capital contributions from Vreeken when the court relied on substantial, competent evidence? 
(I) Whether Respondents are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees? 
III. ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL 
The Golds respectfully request an award of attorneys' fees and costs on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 12-123. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-
120(3), an award of attorneys fees and costs is appropriate to the prevailing party in an action 
involving a commercial transaction. The Golds do not dispute Appellants' contention that the 
transactions at issue are commercial business transactions. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 33). 
Further, many of Appellants' issues were never presented to the district court and are unsupported 
by the record, entitling Respondents to fees for frivolous claims pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-123. 
IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
With regard to the claims that were dismissed on summary judgment, "this Court's standard 
of review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion." 
Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 395, 162 P.3d 772, 774-75 (2007). Summary judgment is 
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the Affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "The party seeking summary judgment faces the 
burden of proving the absence of material facts, but if' a party moves for summary judgment on the 
12 
basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to an element of the non-moving 
party's case, the non-moving party must establish the existence of an issue of fact regarding that 
element."' BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399, 402 (2007) (quoting 
Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 lda.½o 270, 273, 869 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1994)). 
"When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, resolution of the possible 
conflict between inferences is within the responsibilities of the trial court as fact finder. The trial 
judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary 
judgment, but rather the judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from 
uncontroverted evidentiary facts, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." Chapin, 144 
Idaho at 396, 162 P.3d at 775 (citing Intermountain Forest Management v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 
136 Idaho 233,235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001)). 
Factual determinations by the court in the trial of this matter are reviewed under a clear error 
standard. See l.R.C.P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."). 
"To decide whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this court must determine whether the 
findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence. Evidence is substantial and competent 
if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it. Findings based on substantial, competent 
evidence, even if conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal." Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 
325, 78 P.3d 389, 392 (2003) (internal citations omitted). 
"When an action is tried to a court without a jury, determinations as to the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, its probative effect and inferences and conclusions 
to be drawn there from, are all matters within the province of the trial court. The trial court's findings 
of fact will be liberally construed in favor of the judgment entered." Estate of Skvorak v. Security 
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Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 19, 89 P.3d 856, 859 (2004) (internal citations omitted). Any 
conclusions oflaw are reviewed by this Court de nova. Lovitt, 139 Idaho at 325, 78 P.3d at 392. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on Appellants' Cross-
Claims. 
1. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Appellants' Fraud/Misrepresentation Claim 
Because There Was Np P:r:;_;;' vi' ivi1srepre~d1tatiun andh"lr T11dif1:1hlP Rdiance. 
Gorrectly granted summary judgment on Appellants' claim of 
fr:,· .1/misrepresentation because they tailed ,0 carry their burden of proof to establish the required 
elements for fraud/misrepresentation. In support of t1,2;r first motion for sum,:,ary judgment, the 
Golds produced substantial evidence by way of affidavits which established that Vreeken could not 
demonstrate misrepresentations by T. Gold or justifiable reliance on any alleged misrepresentations, 
both of which are required elements of their claim. (R. Vol. IV, p. 820-72; Vol. V, p. 873,956, 957-
1030). As a result, the burden shifted to Appellants to establish the existence of both elements. See 
BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399,402 (2007). 
Appellants have not contested the legal standard applicable to their claim of 
fraud/misrepresentation. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 11 ).3 A claim for material/misrepresentation 
under Massachusetts law (which the parties agree governs the substantive elements of this case 
relating to the MOU) requires the following: 
To establish a claim of material misrepresentation the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant made a false statement of material fact to the plaintiff, concerning a fact 
that a reasonable person would consider important in making the decision the 
3 Pursuant to the MOU, the law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts applied. (Trial Ex. 6, p. 
8). Neither party has contested the application of Massachusetts Law to this claim. 
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plaintiff was about to make, and that the plaintiff relied on the defendant's statement 
to his detriment. Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 72, 77-78 (1992). 
Porcaro v. Chen, 2004 WL 3091558, *4 (Mass. Super. 2004). With regard to demonstrating 
justifiable reliance, Massachusetts law requires the following: 
[I]n Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 374, 124 N.E.2d 912 (1955), [the Supreme 
Judicial Court] adopted the rule of the Restatement o/Torts sec. 540 (1938), which 
states: "The recipient in a business transaction of a fraudulent misrepresentation of 
fact is justified in relying on its truth, although he might have ascertained the falsity 
of the representation had he made a.'1 investigation .... " The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts sec. 540 states: "The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is 
justified in relying upon its truth, although he might have ascertained the falsity of 
the representation had he made an investigation." Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 
541 states: "The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justified in relying 
upon its truth ifhe knows that it is false or its falsity is obvious to him." There is thus 
a distinction between a falsity that could only be uncovered by way of"investigation" 
and a falsity that was readily apparent or "obvious." Comment a to Restatement 
(Second) of Torts sec. 540, supra, states that, "if a mere cursory glance would have 
disclosed the falsity of the representation, its falsity is regarded as obvious under the 
rule stated in sec. 541." 
Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi, 2004 WL 3019442, *19 (Mass. Super. 2004). 
In their brief, Appellants summarily claim that the record supports that both written and oral 
misrepresentations were made to Vreeken upon which Appellants relied to their detriment. 
(Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 12). The record cited by Appellants are portions of deposition 
transcripts and affidavits submitted by Golds in support of their various Motions for Summary 
Judgment. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 12). The po1iions of the record cited by Appellants are 
not relevant to the issue of alleged misrepresentations. For example, Appellants cite Volume III, p. 
497-509 and p. 564-566. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 12). The bulk of this deposition testimony 
concerns Vreeken's transfer of money to his daughter, Christianne, to purchase the Bank ofidaho 
debt. The only portion ofVreeken's testimony which relates to representations made to Vreeken 
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supports the district court's decision. (R. Vol. III, p. 497).4 Appellants claim the record supports 
their position, but fail to identify any alleged misrepresentations in the record. 
Further, Appellants boldly assert in their Brief that "the deposition excerpts of Melanie 
Harris, Lorna Schubert, John Teti, and Hans Van der Sande all demonstrate the confusion and 
uncertainly relating to the Golds' management of LPI and its financial status." (Amended 
Appellants' Brief, p. 12). Not a single citation to the record follows Appellants' assertion. 
Appellants have identified no evidence which supports their claims that any misrepresentation was 
made and/or that Vreeken had a right to rely on any alleged misrepresentation. 
Based on the overwhelming evidence before it, the district court found that Vreeken could 
not have relied on alleged misrepresentations. First, Vreeken testified in his deposition that he did 
not rely on any written information, but only the oral discussions with T. Gold. (R. Vol. V, p. 1090-
91; R. Vol. IV, p. 826-27). During his deposition, Vreeken could not identify the alleged 
misrepresentations by T. Gold. (R. Vol. IV, p. 826-28). As a result ofVreeken's admissions, the 
district court limited its analysis to the oral representations alleged by Vreeken later in his 
memorandum in opposition. (R. Vol. V, p. 1092). The district court failed to find that Vreeken 
justifiably relied on any statement from T. Gold because the evidence demonstrated that Vreeken 
4 The exchange Appellants claim supports alleged misrepresentations is as follows: 
Q. And so between the two of you, you reviewed whatever information you had and 
decided to execute the agreement; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Were you relying on information supplied to you from anyone else within your 
companies? 
A.No. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 497). 
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knew the financial and administrative status of LPC and LPCI and did not trust T. Gold or his 
valuation of the business. (R. Vol. V, p. 1092-95). As detailed in the facts, Vreeken or his agents 
visited LPC' s offices on multiple occasions and were given access to all business records. (R. Vol. 
V, p. 875-76, 898). As a result of those visits, a detailed "Management Letter" was prepared, 
describing the significant management and accounting issues. (R. Vol. V, p. 876, 899-904). 
Vreeken acknowledged that he was aware of the problems. (R. Vol. V, p. 876-77). 
On December 11, 1999, T. Gold provided to Vreeken a "buy out proposal," stating the 
following: 
The deal is AS IS WHERE IS. I am not going to make any financial or other 
representations about the business, or allow any other basis for anyone to come back 
against me when it comes time to pay the purchase price. In other words, this must 
be a clean deal if your desire is to pay me out over time. 
(R. Vol. V, p. 877, 909-11). Further, the MOU specifically excluded any financial representations 
and warranties in its integration clause at paragraph 6, which reads as follows: 
[T]his Agreement contains the entire understanding of the parties with respect to the 
subject matter hereof and supercedes all prior agreements, understandings and 
negotiations of the parties with respect thereto. Except as expressly stated or referred 
to herein, there are no other restrictions, promises, representations, warranties, 
covenants or undertakings in connection herewith. ( emphasis added) 
(R. Vol. V, p. 877, 912-22). Vreeken also admitted that the Golds did not provide any promises, 
representations, warranties, covenants or undertakings except those set forth in the MOU and 
Appellants were not relying on any representations, warranties and/or statements in connection with 
their execution of the tv10U. (R. "Vol. IV, p. 826-34). Appellar1ts provided no evidence of 
misrepresentations or justifiable reliance. Based on the overwhelming evidence before it, and 
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Appellants' failure to carry their burden, the district court correctly dismissed Appellants' claim for 
fraud/misrepresentation. 
2. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Appellants' Claim for Breach of the Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Because the Alleged Conduct Occurred 
Prior to the Execution of the MOU. 
Appellants have offered no argument in support of their allegation that the district court erred 
in dismissing their claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In 
Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, 443 Mass. 367, 371, 2005 WL 289185, *4 (2005), the 
Massachusetts Court set forth the requirements of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing: 
Every contract in Massachusetts is subject, to some extent, to an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 
Mass.451, 473, 583 N.E.2d 806 (I 991 ). This implied covenant may not be "invoked 
to create rights and duties not otherwise provided for in the existing contractual 
relationship," Uno Restaurants, Inc. v. Boston Kenmore Realty Corpi41 Mass. 376, 
385, 805 N.E.2d 957 (2004), but rather concerns the manner of performance. It has 
been explained that the implied covenant exists so that the objectives of the contract 
may be realized. See Crellin Technologies, Inc. v. Equipment/ease Corp., 18 F.3d 1, 
10 (1st Cir.1994). The concept of good faith and fair dealing in any one context is 
shaped by the nature of the contractual relationship from which the implied covenant 
derives. The scope of the covenant is only as broad as the contract that governs the 
particular relationship. 
Based on this undisputed law, the district court correctly dismissed the claims because Appellants' 
alleged evidence occurred prior to the MOU. Paragraph 2.h. of the MOU states as follows: 
The Lockwood Entities and Vreeken agree to sign a release effectively releasing [T. 
Gold] and [R. Gold] from any and all claims they may have against them, with the 
exception of claims grounded in fraud or related to this Agreement, including any 
further obligations under that certain Joint Venture Agreement dated October 30, 
1995. 
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Appellants produced no evidence that the Golds interfered with or injured Appellants' rights 
pursuant to the MOU after its execution. (R. Vol. V, p. 1096). Consequently, the district court 
correctly dismissed Appellants' claim. 
B. The District Court Correctly Determined That Appellants Breached the MOU Because 
They Failed to Contest the Motion and the District Court's Decision Was Based on 
Uncontroverted Evidence. 
Appellants admit they failed to contest the Golds' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding 
the breach of the MOU, but claim that the district court should have "searched" the record on their 
behalf and found facts to defeat the Motion. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 13-14; R. Vol. V, p. 
1097). The responding party and not the district court carries the burden to respond with evidence 
illustrating a genuine issue of material fact: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the 
party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against the party. 
I.R.C.P. 56( e) ( emphasis added). In a recent case, this Court rejected a similar argument from a party 
who failed to respond to a summary judgment motion. See Esser v. Lost River Ballistics Tech., Inc., 
_Idaho_, _P.3d_, 2008 WL 2052338 (May 15, 2008) (subject to revision or withdrawal). In 
Esser, the plaintiff failed to respond to the summary judgment with affidavits or otherwise. See id. 
at *I. Further, plaintiff failed to direct the trial court to facts asserted in the verified complaint, 
\vhich plaintiff later asserted created genuine issues of material fact. See id. at * 5. On appeal, 
plaintiff claimed the district court improperly granted summary judgment. This Court affirmed the 
district court's decision, and stated: 
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[T]he trial court is not required to search the record looking for evidence that may 
create a genuine issue of material fact; the party opposing the sununary judgment is 
required to bring that evidence to the court's attention. Where Esser Electric's 
counsel did not argue to the district court that the verified complaint should be 
considered as a sworn statement in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, 
we will not consider on appeal whether the district court erred in failing to do so. 
Esser, 2008 WL 2052338 at *5-6. As in Esser, the district court was not required to scour the 
record for facts to oppose the motion. 
Appellants now claim on appeal that the Golds' evidence of business expenses and charges 
contained "inconsistencies," "unexplained expenses," and "unrelated charges." (Amended 
Appellants' Brief, p. 14). Although the Golds disagree with the allegations, Appellants are several 
years too late with their objections. They had an opportunity to respond and did nothing. That error 
is their own and not the district court's. 
Appellants also incorrectly argue that any inferences, assuming that any existed, should have 
been resolved in their favor. Again, this argument has been rejected by this Court and misstates the 
standard of review. See Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335, 337-38, 689 P.2d 
227, 229-30 (Ct. App. 1984). In Verb ill is, the party opposing sununary judgment attempted the very 
same argument. The Idaho Court of Appeals, addressing this Court's prior rulings on the issue, 
responded as follows: 
The [ defendant J also contends that the consumers were not entitled to the inference 
of a defect because, in a sununary judgment proceeding, all inferences must be drawn 
in favor of the nonmoving party. This contention fails upon two grounds. First, an 
inference adverse to the norunoving party may be drawn if it is the only reasonable 
inference. Here, disregarding a.riy hypothecated fact and focusing upon facts set forth 
in the record, we find no basis for any reasonable inference except that the 
compressor was defective. Secondly, in Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 
Idaho 515,519,650 P.2d 657,661 (1982), our Supreme Court held if"evidentiary 
facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, 
summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, 
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because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those 
inferences." A jury trial was not requested in this case. The (defendant] did not 
controvert the evidentiary facts advanced by the [plaintiffs]. Therefore, the magistrate 
was not constrained to draw all inferences in favor of the [defendant]. He could, and 
did, draw his own reasonable inference from the undisputed facts before him. 
Verb ill is, I 07 Idaho at 337-38, 689 P.2d at 229-30 (internal citations omitted). Likewise, the district 
court, as the trier of fact, was able to draw reasonable inferences from the undisputed facts before 
it. The district court correctly granted the Golds' Judgment on the breach of the MOU. 
C. The District Court Correctly Determined That Appellant Vreeken is Obligated to 
Indemnify R. Gold on the Citizens Bank Loan and T. Gold on the EIEDC Loan 
Because the Language and Intent of the MOU Requires it. 
Appellants' argument that the MOU does not require Vreeken to indemnify the Golds ignores 
the law and the clear language and intent of the MOU. For contract interpretation issues, this Court 
applies the following standard of review: 
The existence of ambiguity deterh1ines the standard of review of a lower court's 
interpretation of a contract or instrument. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ethington Family 
Trust, 137 Idaho 435, 437-38, 50 P.3d 450, 452-53 (2002). "The initial inquiry into 
whether a ... legal instrument is ambiguous presents a legal question, over which this 
court exercises free review." Chubbuckv. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,201, 899 
P.2d 411, 414 (1995); Union Pac. R.R. Co., at 437-38, 50 P.3d at 452-53 . "An 
instrument which is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation is ambiguous." 
Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 858, 673 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1983). "The legal 
effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court as a 
question of law." Id. at 857, 673 P.2d at 1051. "If, however, the instrument of 
conveyance is ambiguous, interpretation of the instrument is a matter of fact for the 
trier of fact." Id. 
Mountainview Landowners Coop. Assoc., Inc., v. Cool , 139 Idaho 770, 772, 86 P.3d 484, 486 
(2004). 
Under Massachusetts law, there are three sets of circumstances which may give rise to a right 
of indemnification: an express agreement to indemnify, an implied contractual right of 
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indemnification or a tort-based right based on a great disparity in the fault of the parties. Araujo v. 
Woods Hole et.al., 693 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1982). An implied contractual right of indemnification 
will be found where there is a "special relationship" between the parties or when there are "unique 
special factors" demonstrating that the parties intended the would-be indemnitor to bear the ultimate 
liability. See Fireside Motors, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 479 N.E.2d 1386, 1391 (1985). 
The district court interpreted the MOU to create a right of indemnification. (R. Vol. VI, p. 
1228). Pursuant to Paragraph 2.c. of the MOU, the Lockwood Entities agreed to use their best 
efforts to obtain the release of the Golds from the Joans described therein (including specifically the 
EIEDC loan) and Vreeken agreed that he would be personally obligated on such loans in order to 
obtain the release of the Golds from such loans. Paragraph 2.c. of the MOU states as follows: 
The Lockwood Entities will use their best efforts to effectthe release of: (I) [T. Gold] 
and [R. Gold] from certain personal guarantees they have made with regard to the 
following loans and (ii) certain securities pledged by [R. Gold] which is being held 
as collateral for the Citizen's Loan, as defined below. If necessary to effect such 
releases, Vreeken agrees to personally guarantee such loans. If the Lockwood 
Entities fail to provide such release by the earlier of: (w) three (3) months after all 
audited financials for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 are completed or (x) March 1, 2001, 
then [T. Gold] and [R. Gold] shall have the option of terminating this Agreement as 
provided in Section 11 hereof, unless Vreeken shall expressly opt to indemnify [T. 
Gold] and [R. Gold] from any damages they may incur as a result of such personal 
guarantees. Until the earlier to occur of: (y) the releases pursuant to this Section 2( c) 
are effected or (z) this Agreement is terminated as provided herein, any damage [T. 
Gold] and [R. Gold] may incur as a result of such personal guarantees not being 
released shall be secured by the assets of Lockwood Packaging and Lockwood 
Packaging Idaho. 
(R. Vol. V, p. 915; Trial Ex. 6, p. 4). The district court also noted that "Section 1 (c) states that its 
terms shall be inapplicable if' [T. Gold] and/or [R. Gold] are not being indemnified by Vreeken with 
regard to their personal guarantees as specified in Section 2(c)."' (R. Vol. VI, p. 1228). 
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Under the language of the MOU, the Golds specifically contracted to relinquish any interest 
they had in the Lockwood Entities with the primary understanding that Vreeken and the Lockwood 
Entities would relieve the Golds from liability on the Lockwood Entities' debts. All parties 
understood that the Lockwood Entities' failure to obtain the release of the Golds from such 
commitments could have resulted in liability on the part of the Golds. Therefore, the parties agreed 
that Vreeken would execute personal guarantee(s) (and become personally liable for those 
obligations) to ensure the Golds' release. As the district court stated in a prior ruling, "[i]mplied in 
the agreement to use best efforts is the understanding that Vreeken agreed to personally guarantee 
the loans, if such guarantee was necessary." (R. Vol. VI, p. 1130-31 ). 
Vreeken agreed to become personally liable for these loans if necessary to obtain release of 
the Golds. The comt correctly interpreted this undertaking ( expressed in cursory fashion in what was 
intended to be a preliminary document) to effectively constitute an agreement by Vreeken to 
indemnify the Golds. Appellants have offered no real argument contrary to this interpretation. 
Based on the intent and language of the MOU, the district court correctly found a right of 
indemnification. 
D. The District Court Never Ruled on Any Alleged Motion to Amend to Conform to the 
Pleadings and Any Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Was Barred by the MOU. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find a breach of fiduciary duty 
because it never had an opportunity to rule on the issue. "It is well established that in order for an 
issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an 
assignment of error." Whitted v. Canyon County Bd. ofComr 's, 137 Idaho 118, 121, 44 P.3d 1173, 
1176 (2002). Issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally not considered. Whitted, 121 
Idaho at 122; 44 P.3d at 1177. 
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"The determination whether an issue has been tried with consent of the parties is within the 
trial court's discretion, and such determination will only be reversed when that discretion has been 
abused." Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 226, 46 P.3d 518, 522 (2002). "Although I.R.C.P. 
! 5(b) permits a court to base its decision on a theory fully tried by the parties, an issue not tried 
either [by] express or implied consent cannot be the basis for the decision. The requirement that the 
unpleaded issues be tried by at least the implied consent of the parties assures that the parties have 
notice of the issues before the court and an opportunity to address those issues with evidence and 
argument." MK. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345,349,612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980). 
"Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue is not established merely because evidence 
relevant to that issue was introduced without objection. At least it must appear that the parties 
understood the evidence to be aimed at the unpleaded issue." Id. (quoting MB! Motor Co., Inc. v. 
Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709, 711 (6th Cir. 1974)). 
In a similar case, this Court rejected an argument that the actions of the appellants were 
sufficient to amend to assert an unpleaded theory. In PFC, Inc. v. Rockland Telephone Co., the 
plaintiff, before resting its case, "moved to amend its complaint to conform to the proof; however, 
the motion did not seek to add the theory of account stated for the court's consideration. Finally, 
PFC asked for no findings on account stated, and the district court made none." 121 Idaho 1036, 
1039, 829 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1992). On appeal, this Court stated: "We will not decide a question 
which was not presented and on which no ruling was obtained in the court below." Id. 
There is no dispute that Appellants failed to plead a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. (R. 
Vol. III, p. 426-434). Noticeably absent from Appellants' argument regarding their alleged motion 
to amend to conform to the evidence is actual evidence in the record that any such motion or the 
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issue of breach of fiduciary duty was ever presented to the district court for consideration. 
Appellants alleged Motion consisted of nothing more than the following: 
Mr. Manwaring: 
The Court: 
No other witnesses. Prior to resting, we'd simply make a 
motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence presented. 
Thank you. All right. That completes the evidentiary portion 
of the trial. We're going to set up a briefing schedule for 
closing argument. 
(Tr. Vol. III, p. 143, In. 12-18). Based on this exchange, Appellants argue that the district court 
granted their motion to assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. (Amended Appellants' Brief, 
p. 20). Appellants have pointed to no other evidence in the record to reflect that they sought a ruling 
from the district court regarding a breach of fiduciary duty claim. As a result, the district court's 
Order after the trial contains no findings of facts with regard to an alleged motion to amend or a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. (R. Vol. 6, p. 1288-1310). 
The evidence cited by Appellants also does not indicate that the fiduciary breach issue was 
expressly or impliedly tried to the court. In fact, the Golds' objected to the testimony. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 69- 70). Appellants claim that the transcript demonstrates in Volume III, pages 134, 138, and 141 
that T. Gold breached his fiduciary duty to Vreeken, causing him $2,000,000 in actual damages and 
the Joss of critical security interests. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 20). A close review of the 
transcript identified by Appellant clearly evidences that there is no support for their argument. 
Finally, the district court's prior ruling that the parties' release in the MOU prohibited any 
claims other than fraud/misrepresentation bars Appellants' claim. (R. Vol. V, p. 1096-97). All of 
the alleged evidence of breach of fiduciary duty is based on conduct prior to the execution of the 
MOU. The parties to the MOU released all claims pertaining to such alleged conduct. (Trial Ex. 
6, p. 3). Consequently, the district court did not en. 
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E. The District Court Never Ruled Whether Vreeken Had to Be Subpoenaed in His Native 
Language Because Appellants Never Raised the Issue and Have Long Been Barred 
From so Doing. 
Appellants' claim that there was error in the manner in which Vreeken was subpoenaed is 
barred for several reasons. First, Appellants may not raise the matter of personal jurisdiction on 
appeal because there is no adverse ruling by the district court on the issue. "To raise an issue on 
appeal, the record must contain an adverse ruling to form the basis for assignment of error and this 
Court will not consider orreview an issue raised for the first time on appeal." Magnuson Properties 
Partnership v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 59 P.3d 971 (2002) (citing Whitted v. Canyon 
County Bd. ofCom'rs, 137 ldaho 118, 121-22, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176-77 (2002)) (emphasis added). 
Because the district court never ruled on the issue of personal jurisdiction, there is no adverse ruling 
in the record to form the basis for assignment of error.5 
Second, the issue was not raised in Appellant's first responsive pleading. (R. Vol. III, p. 426-
434). Although Appellants raised the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in their 
answer, Appellants are not arguing lack of personal jurisdiction, but rather insufficiency of process, 
a separate affirmative defense. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 17). Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure I 2(b ), "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for reliefin any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto 
if one is required .... " ( emphasis added). Further, "[ a J defense of lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived unless it is made 
by motion prior to filing a responsive pleading and prior to filing any other motion .... " I.R.C.P. 
5 Due to the fact that personal jurisdiction cannot now be raised, whether or not the process 
served on Vreeken in Holland complied with the service of process requirements of the Hague 
Convention need not be addressed. 
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12(g)(l). Appellants did not raise the issue of insufficiency of process by motion prior to their first 
responsive pleading, or even in their first responsive pleading, and therefore waived their right to 
challenge sufficiency of process. (R. Vol. III, p. 426-434). 
Third, assuming arguendo that Appellants' challenge to sufficiency of process is deemed to 
fall under the umbrella of personal jurisdiction, Appellants are barred from raising the issue of lack 
of personal jurisdiction on appeal because the defense was waived by submission. Raising lack of 
personal jurisdiction in an answer without further action constitutes a waiver. See Moore's Federal 
Practice 3d, § 12.31 [3]. In Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, the Court found that the defendant waived any 
claims oflack of personal jurisdiction, even though the defense was mentioned in the answer, when 
the defendant participated in extensive pretrial proceedings and passed up many opportunities to 
move to dismiss during the four-year course oflitigation. 197 F.3d 58, 160 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added); see also Continental Bank, NA. v. Meyer, IO F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (7 th Cir. 1993) (finding that 
although the defendant complied technically with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(l), he actively proceeded 
with defense, waiving his right to objection to personal jurisdiction); Wyrough & Loser v. Pelmor 
Labs, Inc., 376 F.2d 543, 547 (3d Cir. 1967) (same). In the case at hand, despite the fact that 
Appellants raised the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction in their answer, thereby technically 
complying with the requirements ofI.R.C.P. I 2(g), Appellants fully participated in their defense and 
failed to move to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds during the multi-year course oflitigation. 
Further, Appellants asserted counterclaims and cross-claims with their answer. (R. Vol. III, p. 426-
434). This active participation in the litigation and failure to move to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction constitutes a waiver of the defense. Appellants may not now raise the issue on appeal. 
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F. Appellants Never Raised the Issue of Needing a Dutch Interpreter for Vreeken's 
Deposition and the District Court Was Never Given an Opportunity to Rule. 
Appellants cannot argue error when the district court was completely unaware of the issue 
and never "denied" Vreeken an interpreter. Nothing in the record suggests that Vreeken ever 
requested an interpreter for his deposition or raised the issue before the district court. In fact, the 
Golds moved for summary judgment, relying in part on portions ofVreeken's deposition. (R. Vol. 
IV, p. 824-38). Appellants made no objection or claim that Vreeken did not adequately understand 
English. As noted previously, "[t]o raise an issue on appeal, the record must contain an adverse 
ruling to form the basis for assignment of error and this Court will not consider or review an issue 
raised for the first time on appeal." Magnuson Properties Partnership v. City o,fCoeur D'Alene, 138 
Idaho 166, 59 P.3d 971 (2002) (citing Whitted v. Canyon County Bd. of Com'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 
121-22, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176-77 (2002)). Because Appellants did not raise the interpreter issue 
previously, Appellants are now barred from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. 
In addition, I.C.A.R. 52(a) was not intended to protect a party represented by counsel and 
who could have requested an interpreter if needed. Although Vreeken cites to I.R.C.P. 42(b)(2), 
I.R.C.P. 43(b )(2) addresses requests for an interpreter. Rule 43(b )(2) states: "If any party, or persons 
the party intends to call as a witness, needs an interpreter as provided in Idaho Court Administrative 
Rule 52, the party shall so notify the court at least fourteen (14) days before commencement 
of the court proceedings . ... " I.R.C.P. 43(b)(2) (emphasis added). Vreeken could have made a 
motion for a court appointed interpreter for his deposition, but he did not. If the court were to find 
error in this circumstance, it would expose the Idaho court system to an unprecedented burden both 
in civil and criminal cases where non-native English speakers were involved. 
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More important, Vreeken did not need an interpreter. Vreeken's testimony during his 
depositions and trial indicate that he was able to adequately communicate with his attorney, he 
understood the questions asked of him in English, and he understood the proceedings. Moreover, 
his comprehension is iJlustrated through his coherent, detailed answers in English. (R. Vol. I, p. 159-
161; R. Vol. IV, p. 824-838; R. Vol. III,p. 497-503; R. Vol. IV, p. 736-745). Vreeken can obviously 
communicate well in English because he communicated with his employees in English. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 105-106). Further still, a review of the relevant deposition testimony reveals that Vreeken 
confirmed his non-reliance on any alleged representations by T. Gold, even after a brief recess and 
opportunity to consult with his counsel on the subject. (R. Vol. IV, p. 828-30). Therefore, Vreeken 
was neither entitled to an interpreter at his deposition, nor did the district court err by unknowingly 
failing to provide one. 
G. The District Court's Findings That Vreeken Engaged in Wrongful Conduct Is 
Supported by Substantial, Competent Evidence. 
Appellants ignore the overwhelming evidence supporting the district court's findings of fact 
regarding Vreeken's misconduct. As the Appellants' acknowledge, the district court's findings of 
fact will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. l.R.C.P. 52(a). At trial, two issues remained: 
"(l) whether Vreeken, by reason of his actions, opened the door to personal liability on the Payout 
Notes provided for in the MOU, and (2) whether the location of Vreeken's alleged misconduct 
occuITed within Massachusetts to an extent required to trigger the operation of Massachusetts 
General Law ("MGL") Ch. 93 A." (R. Vol. VI, p. 1295). 6 Consequently, the primary evidence 
during the three-day trial revolved around Vreeken's actions concerning the Golds' rights and 
6 The district court found against Respondents on this second issue, and Respondents have not 
appealed this finding. 
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expectations arising from the MOU. The district court found, after hearing all the evidence, that 
Vreeken had engaged in acts to circumvent and interfere with the Golds' bargained-for consideration 
under the MOU, subjecting him to personal liability. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1300-04). 
Appellants contest two of the district court's findings of fact. (Amended Appellants' Brief, 
p. 24). First, Appellants claim that the district court erred in finding that Vreeken knowingly filed 
UCC financing statements in the assets of LPC and LPCI with a priority over any liens on those 
assets by the Golds. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 24). Appellants assert the finding is in error 
because Vreeken testified he did not know what UCC security interests were or how they operated, 
and the filings were performed by his legal counsel. 7 
Second, Appellants argue that the district court erred in finding Christianne 's purchase of the 
Bank of Idaho's interest manipulated by Vreeken because Appellants claim Christianne' s payment 
to the Bank of Idaho was an "arms-length" transaction. (Amended Appellants' Brief, p. 24). 
Essentially, Appellants are asking this Court to make new determinations regarding credibility, alter 
the weight given to certain testimony, and revise the district court's findings of fact. "Findings based 
on substantial, although conflicting, evidence will not warrant reversal." Mountainview Landowners 
Coop. Assoc., Inc. v. Cool, 139 Idaho 770, 772, 86 P.3d 484, 486 (2004). 
In this case, there is substantial, competent evidence to support the district court's findings 
of fact. Vreeken acknowledged in his testimony that he executed the Vreeken UCC's and sent them 
to his legal counsel in Massachusetts for filing. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 53-55). The Vreeken UCC's show 
on their face that they were returned to Massachusetts after filing in Idaho. (Trial Ex. 13A and 13B; 
7 Although irrelevant to the argument, Vreeken claims that T. Gold fraudulently filed a UCC lien 
against LPI's assets. There is no evidence in the record to support Appellants' allegation. (R. Vol. I, p. 
225-26; Trial Ex. 9). 
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Tr. Vol. II, p. 51-52). Vreeken did not testify that he failed to understand what a security interest is 
or how it operates. The limited testimony indicates he did not know what the acronym UCC meant. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 4 7-48, 117-18). The Vreeken UCC's gave public notice that Gerbroeders and LEBV 
were claiming "[a] continuing security interest in all accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles, 
documents of title, instruments, investment property, inventory, machinery, equipment, fixtures and 
other goods" ofLPCI and LPC. (Trial Ex. 13A and 13B). Vreeken further testified attrial that, even 
having acknowledged the absence of security agreements supporting the Vreeken UCC's, he was 
upset because someone had forgotten to continue these financing statements. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 135-36). 
He indicated a strong preference that the Vreeken UCC's still be in full force and effect, again despite 
the absence of any security agreement to support them. Thus, whether Vreeken understood the 
import of these UCC's when they were filed, he certainly came to understand their import and his 
lack of right to maintain those filings during the six-year course of this litigation. In spite of these 
understandings, Vreeken contumaciously maintained his position and desire that these filings remain 
in place, to the prejudice of Respondents' rights and interest, even at trial. Further, as testified by T. 
Gold, and as ruled by the Court in its prior decisions and orders, the MOU provides that the Golds' 
security interests were only to be subordinate to current bank loans, all security positions on record 
and any future refinancing of such bank loans as of the date of the MOU. (Trial Ex. 6, p. 3; Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 15-18). Appellants have identified no evidence that the interests allegedly evidenced by the 
Vreeken UCC's were of record as of the date of the MOU, or that there was ever any intention that 
the Golds' security interests were to be subordinate to these alleged interests. 
The effect of the filing of the Vreeken UCC's prior to the Golds' was a representation to the 
world at large that LEBV and Gerbroeders had an all-assets lien on the assets of LPC and LPCI, 
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superior in priority to that of the Golds. T. Gold in his testimony referred to the intent and obligation 
of the parties under the MOU to create in the Golds' favor a perfected priority security interest in all 
of the assets ofLPC, subordinate only to those liens specifically enumerated. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 21-31). 
The liens of the Vreeken entities were not among those enumerated liens. T. Gold testified that, as 
a result of the intervening purported liens of the Vreeken entities on the Golds' collateral, the Golds 
could not properly proceed against that collateral, because they could not offer clean title to a 
prospective buyer at public or private sale. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 24-25). 
T. Gold also testified pertaining to the various remedies and options which would have been 
available to the Golds had they been able to proceed against their collateral. He testified that a prior 
perfected security interest in the assets of LPCI and LPC, when coupled with a security interest in 
LPCI's stock, would have been a powerful tool to recover amounts due under the Payout Notes. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 24-26). Instead, the Golds. could not foreclose on any of their collateral with any 
expectation of realizing any value because Vreeken filed the Vreeken UCC's, giving public notice 
of an alleged security interest in all of the assets of LPC aud LPCI which had priority senior to the 
security interests of Golds. Due to this intervening claim, the Golds were not able to offer clean title 
to third parties, and the Golds' access to and the value of their collateral was thereby grossly 
impaired. Further, the Golds never were able to perfect their security interest in the LPCistock, 
because the stock was never properly delivered out of the control of Vreeken. The district court had 
ample evidence to find that Vreeken's acts in interfering with the Golds' security interests provided 
in the MOU breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
As testified by T. Gold at trial, during the course of this six-year litigation, the value of the 
Golds' collateral diminished from millions of dollars (more than enough to secure obligations owing 
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to the Golds under the MOU) to nothing at the time of trial, LPCI having then gone out of business. 
At the time of trial, LPCI had no accounts receivable and virtually no inventory. The value of 
machinery and equipment was reduced to almost nothing. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 26-35). 
Likewise, substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that Vreeken 
orchestrated through Christianne payment to Bank ofldaho of the balance due on the Bank ofidaho 
loan and assignment of the Bank ofidaho Loan to Christianne to thwart the Golds' rights under the 
MOU. Melanie Harris, the bookkeeper for LPCI, described the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the payment of the Bank of Idaho debt. (Trial Ex. 1 and 2; Tr. Vol. I, p. 21-27). Melanie Harris 
stated that she had direct discussions with Vreeken pertaining to the wire transfer of the funds to 
LPCI and she received instructions from Vreeken on the usage of the funds to satisfy the amount due 
to Bank ofldaho on the Bank ofidaho debt. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 21-27). Melanie Harris further testified 
in detail about how the assets of LPCI were transferred from LPCI to Telford (Christianne's 
company) as payment by LPCI on the Bank of Idaho loan acquired by Christianne and assigned by 
her to Telford. By transferring all of the assets to Telford, the Golds' security interests were 
additionally significantly impaired. 
Melanie Harris clearly testified to the following regarding the transfer of assets from LPCI 
to Telford: (i) the transfer of the assets was in payment of amounts due on the Bank ofidaho loan, 
(ii) any outstanding obligations due by LPCI to LEBV or Gerbroeders were not reduced in anyway 
on the books of LPCI as a result of the transfer, (iii) the assets which were transferred constituted 
virtually all of the capital assets with value ofLPCI and as a result of the transfer the value of capital 
assets on the LPCI balance sheet was reduced to zero, (iv) all of the assets which were transferred 
as shown on Trial Exhibit 3 were shown on the books and records ofLPCI as assets owned by LPCI 
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and (v) as a result of the transfer the amount due on the Bank ofldaho debt was reduced on the books 
ofLPCI. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 34-40). Melanie further stated that her discussions involving Telford on the 
asset transfer and pertaining to the ongoing business operations ofTelford were always with Vreeken 
and not with Christianne. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 40). Loma Schuebert's testimony also verified that the asset 
transfer was conducted in the manner described by Melanie Harris. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 99-120). 
Further, Christianne admitted to T. Gold when she "purchased" the Bank ofldaho debt, she 
was just doing what she was told to do by her father and that she did not want any part of the 
transaction. Christianne told T. Gold that she had no idea as to the nature of the transaction when 
she signed the papers, other than it was being done in an effort to get the Golds to take less than they 
were entitled to under the MOU, or for her father to be able to pursue the guarantee ofT. Gold (now 
purportedly owned by Christianne) of the Bank of Idaho obligation. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 46-49). 
Christianne' s failure to appear and protect any interest she might have further confirms that Vreeken 
manipulated the transaction. As the district court noted, "Vreeken's actions, taken together, show 
an overarching plan to divest the Golds of their entitlements under the MOU. His conduct, more 
than simply showing a lack of good faith, manifests bad faith." (R. Vol. VI, p. 1306). The district 
court had substantial, competent evidence to support its findings ofVreeken's wrongful conduct. 
H. The District Court Never Determined That the Assignment from the Bank of Idaho to 
Christianne Was Void. 
The district court did not determine that the assignment from the Bank of Idaho to 
Christianne Vreeken was void. Appellants do not cite the record to assert their position because 
there was no such finding made. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1296-97). "To raise an issue on appeal, the record 
must contain an adverse ruling to form the basis for assignment of error and this Court will not 
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consider or review an issue raised for the first time on appeal." Magnuson Properties Partnership 
v City a/Coeur D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 59 P.3d 971 (2002) (citing Whittedv. Canyon County Bd. 
o/Com'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 121-22, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176-77 (2002))(emphasis added). 
Further, the issue is irrelevant. The district court did not need to find the assignment void 
in order to determine that Vreeken breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As 
set forth previously, the district court found that Vreeken manipulated the transaction through his 
daughter and her dummy corporation, Telford, to impair the Golds' rights and interests pursuant to 
the MOU. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1296-97). Whether the assignment between Christianne Vreeken and the 
Bank ofidaho is void or not has no bearing on the liability created by Vreeken' s wrongful conduct. 
Further, the district court made no such finding, and therefore, committed no error. 
Further, Appellants have no standing to raise a claim belonging to Christianne. She has not 
proffered an appeal in this matter, and is now barred from so doing. Further, the district court ruled 
that the Bank ofrdaho debt was satisfied. (R. Vol. IV, p. 769). This finding has not been appealed 
by Christianne or Appellants, and both are now barred from so doing. The district court did not err. 
I. The District Court Properly Admitted Evidence Through the Testimony of T. Gold 
Based upon a Finding That Christianne Was Vreeken's Agent and the Statement Was 
an Admission of a Party Opponent.8 
Although hearsay is generally not admissible, statements which would normally be 
considered hearsay may be admissible on the basis that 1) they are, in fact, classified as non-hearsay 
or 2) they are subject to one of the hearsay exceptions. During trial, T. Gold was allowed to testify 
to a conversation he had with Christiam1e. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 46-49). The district court correctly 
8 Appellants incorrectly assert the district court allowed the testimony as a statement of a co-
conspirator, which the record does not support. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 47-48). 
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admitted this evidence as non-hearsay under I.RE. 801 ( d)(2), as an admission of a party opponent. 
Specifically, the court determined that the statements fell under subsection (D) of 801(d)(2), "a 
statement by a party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of agency or 
employment of the servant or agent, made during the existence of the relationship." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 
47-48). Concerning the foundational evidence required for admission of evidence under LR.E. 
801(d)(2)(D), the Idaho Court of Appeals has established that "independent evidence of the agency 
relationship, i.e., evidence apart from the alleged agent's own statements, are necessary before the 
alleged agent's out-of-court declarations maybe admitted." R Homes Corp. v. Herr, 142 Idaho 87, 
92, 123 P.3d 720, 725 (Ct. App. 2005)(citingHayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952)). 
"Agency" is a relationship resulting from "the manifestation of consent by one person to another that 
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." Herbst 
v. Bothof Dairies, Inc., I IO Idaho 971,973, 719 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Ct. App. 1986) (citingRestatement 
(Second) Agency§ 1, at 7 (1958)). Early on in the case, it was established through the testimony of 
Vreeken that Christialllle helped her father manage the Lockwood companies, thereby acting as his 
agent in the day-to-day function of the companies. (R. Vol. III, p. 499). Further, Vreeken asked 
Christialllle to use the money he gave her to pay off the Bank of Idaho loan. (R. Vol. III, p. 499). 
Therefore, Christianne was acting as an agent at the time of the transfer, and her comments to T. 
Gold concerning the transfer are admissible as a statement by a party's agent under I.RE. 
801(d)(2)(D). 
Additionally, T. Gold's testimony is also admissible because it qualifies as hearsay subject 
to an exception under the "declarant unavailability" exception of I.RE. 804. Under Rule 804, a 
declarant is considered unavailable when she, "persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject 
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matter of declarant's statement despite a court order to do so" (I.R.E. 804(a)(2)), or when she, "is 
absent from the hearing and the proponent of declarant' s statement have been unable to procure 
declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means." (l.R.E. 804(a)(5)). Prior to trial, the 
Golds made every attempt to obtain Christianne' s testimony, scheduling her deposition five different 
times (August 5, 2003, November 14, 2003, April 5, 2004, September 8, 2004, and September 28, 
2004). On May 3, 2004, the court ordered her to personally appear for the taking of her deposition 
and Christianne still failed to appear. (R. Vol. IV, p. 765). The court ultimately dismissed 
Christianne's claims because of her chronic failure to appear and comply with the court order. (R. 
Vol. IV, p. 761-770). Due to Christianne's failure to cooperate with the Golds and the court order, 
the Golds were unable to procure her attendance through court order or other means. Therefore, 
Christianne was an "unavailable witness" for the purposes ofl.R.E. 804(a)(2) and 804(a)(5). 
Since Christianne was an "unavailable witness," her statements to T. Gold qualify under the 
hearsay exception of I.R.E. 804(b)(3), a statement against interest. As per l.R.E. 804(b)(3), a 
statement against interest is "[a] statement which was at the time of making so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or 
criminal liability ... that a reasonable man in declarant' s position would not have made the 
statement unless declarant believed it to be true." In this case, Christianne' s statements against her 
interest were clear from T. Gold's testimony during his direct examination, possibly establishing her 
own liability. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 48). Therefore, Christianne's statements to T. Gold are statements by 
an unavailable witness against her own interests and are admissible as such under I.R.E. 804(b)(3). 
In the alternative, if it is found that the admission of evidence concerning T. Gold's 
conversation with Christianne was made in error, the error was harmless. Error is disregarded as 
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harmless unless the ruling affects a substantial right of the party. See Herman ex rel. Herman v. 
Herman, 136 Idaho 781, 784, 41 P.3d 209,212 (2002); see also I.R.C.P. 61 andI.R.E. 103(a). In 
this case, the admission of T. Gold's testimony concerning his telephone conversation with 
Christianne did not affect any of the Appellants' substantial rights. Despite the fact that the evidence 
was admitted, the Appellants were still able to conduct a thorough cross-examination of T. Gold. 
Further, Appellants presented evidence in the form ofVreeken's testimony concerning T. Gold's 
conversation with Christianne. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 92). In addition, the district court had other 
substantial, competent evidence upon which to make its findings. Vreeken's manipulation of the 
Bauk of Idaho loan and transfer of assets to Telford was supported by other testimony and 
documentary evidence. (See Section G, discussing Vreeken's wrongful conduct). Consequently, 
even if the district court erred, the district court's findings were supported and corroborated by other 
substantial evidence. 
J. The District Court Correctly Refused to Allow Appellants to Introduce Certain 
Documentary Evidence, and Appellants Never Sought to Use Jack Schipper as a 
Witness at Trial. 
First and foremost, Appellants never included Jack Schipper as a witness in their pretrial 
submission. Mr. Schipper was never mentioned as a witness in either of Appellants' witness and 
exhibit lists (R. Vol. VI, p.1266 and 1269), and was not raised when the Golds' Motion to Exclude 
Testimony and Exhibits was argued. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 8-14). On appeal, the record must contain an 
adverse ruling to form the basis for assignment of error. Magnuson Properties Partnership v. City 
of Coeur D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 59 P.3d 971 (2002). Appellants never submitted Jack Schipper 
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as a witness and never raised the issue as to whether his testimony should be allowed. Consequently, 
there is no adverse ruling on the record and the issue cannot be appealed. 9 
Concerning the district court's exclusion of certain documentary evidence,10 challenges to 
a trial court's evidentiary rnlings are examined under the abuse of discretion standard. See Kozlowski 
v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825,827, 828 P.2d 854, 856 (1992). When considering whether the trial court 
abused its discretion, the Court considers whether the court correctly perceived the issue as 
discretionary, whether the court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
applicable legal standards, and whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. See 
Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'/ Med. Ctr, 134 Idaho 46,995 P.2d 816 (2000) (citing Lamar Corp. v. 
City ofTwin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40,981 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1999)). However, error is disregarded 
as harmless unless the ruling affects a substantial right of the party. Herman, 136 Idaho at 784, 41 
P.3d at 212. 
The district court correctly considered that the decision to admit or exclude the documentary 
evidence in question was discretionary. I.R.E. 104(a), in pertinent part, states, "Preliminary 
questions concerning the qualifications of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or 
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court .... " ( emphasis added). Therefore, 
the court correctly perceived its choice to admit or exclude the evidence as discretionary. 
9 To the extent Appellants are confusing Jack Schipper with either Hans Van Der Sande or 
William Windells, the witnesses added to the witness list of March 28, 2007 (R. Vol. VI, p. 1269) no 
prejndice conld have resulted. The district court allowed both Hans Van Der Sande and William 
Windells to testify. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 12-14). 
10 Exhibits 4-21 of Defendant's Witness and Exhibit List of March 28, 2007. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 13-
14). 
39 
The district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the 
applicable legal standards. The district court denied the admission of the documentary evidence on 
the grounds of late disclosure. (Tr. Vol. I, p.13-14). A trial court may impose sanctions for failure 
to obey a scheduling or pre-trial order upon motion or its own initiative. See McKim v. Horner, 143 
Idaho 568, 572, 149 P.3d 843,847 (2006). Therefore, the exclusion of the documentary exhibits is 
well within the boundaries of the trial court's discretion. The court's authority "is discretionary and 
sanctions may include barring evidence from being introduced, dismissing an action, and assessing 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees." Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687,690,809 P.2d 1166, 
1169 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added). 
In this case, Appellants disclosed the documentary evidence well after the discovery deadline, 
which the court had set no later than fourteen (14) days before trial for each party's list of proposed 
exhibits and no later than seven (7) days before trial for the deposit of exhibits. (R. Vol. VI, p. 
1147). Further, in the Order, the court stated that "No exhibits shall be admitted into evidence at 
trial other than those disclosed, listed and submitted to the clerk of the court in accordance with this 
order, except when offered for impeachment purposes or unless they were discovered after the last 
required disclosure." (R. Vol. VI, p. 1147-48). Appellants submitted their amended witness and 
exhibit list on March 28, 2007, a mere five days before trial, thereby violating the Order, and 
Appellants made no showing of good cause as to why the exhibits should be admitted despite the 
time line set in the Order. More important, Appellants acknowledged that the exhibits had not 
previously been disclosed in response to discovery requests, even though Appellants were aware of 
their existence. Appellants argue as their excuse for late disclosure not that they were unaware of 
the documents, but merely that they did not think they were important. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 10-12). As the 
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district comi judge noted, "This case has been pending nearly six years. There has been plenty of 
opportunity to dig out this material and get it submitted timely in discovery and have it be part of the 
ongoing case. It's simply not excusable to have that revealed the week before trial and included in 
a late filed exhibit list without being disclosed as part of the normal discovery procedure." (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 14). 
Finally, the district court reached its decision by exercise of reason. The district court 
provided valid, legally acceptable reasoning behind its decision to exclude the documentary evidence 
- failure to timely disclose. Such basis for exclusion may be used at the court's discretion. 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing factors, the district court did not abuse its discretion concerning 
the exclusion of the exhibits in question. 
In the alternative, if it is found that the district court did exclude the exhibits in error due to 
an abuse of discretion, the error was harmless and therefore should be disregarded. As noted above, 
error is considered harmless unless a substantial right of the party in question has been affected. 
Herman, !36 Idaho at 784, 41 P.3d at 212. See also I.R.C.P. 61 andI.R.E. l03(a). The exclusion 
of the documents did not affect any of the Appellants' substantial rights. The Appellants were still 
able to put on witnesses to testify to their knowledge and the nature of the contributions made by 
Lockwood Holding to LPI and other various agreements made between LEBV and LPL Therefore, 
the district court's error, if any, was harmless. 
K. The District Court Correctly Determined That Certain Assets were Owned by LPCI 
as Capitai Contributions from Vreeken to LPCI. 
Appellants presented no credible evidence that equipment provided by Vreeken to LPCI was 
provided as loans or leases. The district court carefully set forth the evidence it relied on to 
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determine that the funds to purchase various assets or equipment provided to LPCI were capital 
contributions by Vreeken as follows: 
The Court deems it necessary to explain the finding that the assets were the property 
ofLPCI and not Vreeken. During the course of the trial, evidence was offered that 
many of the big-ticket assets used by LPCI were paid for by Vreeken (by him or 
through his many corporations). Defendants assert that these assets were capital 
contributions, while Plaintiff argues the assets were the property ofVreeken and were 
on lease to LPCI. Based on the evidence offered at trial, the Court finds that these 
assets were contributions of capital and were not the property of Vreeken. 
There is no disagreement that LPCI used the assets purchased by Vreeken in its 
normal business operations. There is some limited dispute concerning the 
significance of the assets being listed on LPCI's books. Vreeken argues that the 
bookkeeping practices before 200 I, when Melanie Harris began employment, were 
poor and did not properly account LPCI' s operations. The Golds argue that the assets 
were listed as the property of LPCI in its sale of those assets to Telford. However, 
LPCI sold the assets to Telford, thereby acting as the owner, settling that dispute .... 
Given the evidence on record, the Court finds that the assets listed on Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 3 were the property of LPCI in the form of capital contributions from 
Vreeken. 
(R. Vol. VI, p. 1297-98; Trial Ex. 3). 
Appellants contest the findings of the district court by pointing to conclusory testimony from 
Vreeken that he did not "intend" any of the relevant equipment to be assets ofLPCI. (Amended 
Appellants' Brief, p. 32). At best, Vreeken has presented an insignificant amount of conflicting 
testimony, which is insufficient to establish clear error. See Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 
325, 78 P.3d 389, 392 (2003) 
The record before this Court also reveals the flaws in Vreeken's argument. Wiiiiam Windels 
testified that all machinery and equipment present at LPCI belonged to LPCI. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 333-
334). Melanie Harris and Lorna Shuebert also testified that the assets had belonged to LPCI prior 
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to the asset transfer to Telford. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 30-34, p. 111-119). This position is further supported 
by: (a) T. Gold's testimony that LPCI had substantial equipment assets in the financial statements 
he reviewed (Tr. Vol. II, p. 26-29), (b) the documentation transferring assets from LPCI to Telford 
(Trial Ex. 3), ( c) the UCC Financing Statements describing equipment ofLPCI which were fiied in 
Idaho by EIEDC (Trial Ex. 8), and ( d) the UCC Financing Statements describing specific equipment 
ofLPCI and LPC filed in Idaho by Vreeken himself (Trial Ex. 13A and 13B; Tr. Vol. II, p. 26-29). 
Appellants have not identified any evidence in the record to support their position that the assets in 
question were not owned by LPCI. The district court's decision is not in error. 
L. Appellants Are Not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees or Costs on Appeal. 
The Golds do not dispute that this action is a commercial transaction and that the prevailing 
party is entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). Because Appellants have not 
demonstrated any error oflaw or fact by the district court, they are not entitled to attorneys' fees or 
costs on appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that the Appeal be dismissed and 
that Respondents be granted their attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~day of July, 2008. 
DeAnne Caspers<m 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
Counsel for Respondents 
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